American Exceptionalism, National Identity, and the Drift Toward Illiberalism

A historical and comparative analysis

Introduction: Why comparisons feel uncomfortable

Comparisons between contemporary politics and historical authoritarianism often provoke strong reactions. Many people instinctively reject them, not because the facts are wrong, but because such comparisons feel accusatory, exaggerated, or morally loaded.

Yet historians do not use comparisons to declare equivalence. They use them to identify patterns, mechanisms, and trajectories. History rarely repeats itself exactly — but it does rhyme.

I do not argue that the United States is fascist, nor that it is destined to become so. Instead, it asks a more careful question:

What structural conditions, historical experiences, and psychological dynamics shape how a society responds to stress — and why do some patterns feel familiar to those with a European historical perspective?

1. A young nation with an old confidence

By European standards, the United States is a very young state.

The U.S. was founded in the late 18th century.
Most European nations carry centuries — sometimes millennia — of political continuity, collapse, occupation, and reconstruction.
Europe’s modern political culture was shaped by repeated experiences of failure: religious wars, dynastic collapse, imperial overreach, occupation, and two world wars.

The United States never experienced:

Foreign occupation
Internal authoritarian rule at the national level
A collapse of sovereignty
A need to rebuild its political system after defeat on its own soil

As a result, American national identity developed with confidence largely untempered by historical trauma. This is not arrogance; it is a product of experience.

Confidence without collapse produces optimism.
Optimism without memory can produce blind spots.

2. A nation formed by self-selected immigrants

Early European immigrants to North America were not a random cross-section of European society.

They were disproportionately:

Risk-takers
Dissatisfied with existing hierarchies
Fleeing poverty, famine, persecution, or stagnation
Seeking reinvention rather than continuity

This created a powerful selection effect.

Societies formed by those who leave tend to value:

Individual agency
Reinvention
Achievement
Breaking with the past

Societies formed by those who stay tend to value:

Stability
Continuity
Incremental change

American culture inherited the psychology of voluntary rupture — a belief that identity can be remade through effort and will. This belief underpinned extraordinary growth and innovation. It also fostered a deep suspicion of inherited authority and restraint.

3. Expansion and the frontier myth

The United States expanded rapidly through conquest and displacement. This expansion became central to its national mythology.

The “frontier” taught powerful lessons:

Land is there to be taken
Progress is inevitable
Strength produces legitimacy
Expansion equals destiny

This was not unique to the U.S., but it occurred faster and more decisively than in Europe, where borders shifted slowly over centuries.

The result was a national story in which success validated morality, and dominance was normalized as proof of virtue. This shaped how power, competition, and legitimacy were understood.

4. No shared ethnicity, language, religion, or memory

Unlike most nations, the early United States had:

No common ethnicity
No single language initially
No shared religion
No shared historical memory

So what bound people together?

Ideology.

Not blood, not ancestry, not tradition — but belief.

Core ideas became the glue:

Individual freedom
Opportunity
Self-reliance
Progress
Moral exceptionalism

This was unusual — and powerful.

But ideological identity has a structural vulnerability:

When identity is belief-based, disagreement feels existential.

If belonging depends on affirming shared ideals, dissent can be framed not as difference, but as disloyalty. This does not cause authoritarianism — but it creates fertile ground for leaders who frame politics as moral purification rather than negotiation.

5. American exceptionalism as civil religion

Over time, American exceptionalism began to function like a civil religion:

America is morally special
Its values are universal
Its success reflects virtue
Its failures must be caused by betrayal or sabotage

This belief system worked well during periods of expansion and dominance. But it struggles in moments of relative decline.

European nations learned — painfully — that decline can be internal and structural.
The U.S., lacking that experience, often interprets decline as theft, not transition.

6. From confidence to grievance

Ultra-nationalism rarely begins with confidence. It begins with wounded pride.

The psychological shift follows a familiar pattern:

We are the best
We are losing
Someone must be responsible
We must be restored

Slogans like “Make America Great Again” are powerful because they imply loss without specifying cause — leaving space for blame, myth, and emotional mobilization.

This does not make a society fascist.
It makes it vulnerable to illiberal narratives.

7. Authoritarian models: why Putin is a better comparison than Hitler

Contemporary authoritarianism rarely resembles 1930s fascism in form.

Russia under Vladimir Putin is not fascist in the classical sense:

There is no mass revolutionary party
No total ideological mobilization
No attempt to remake society completely

Instead, Putinism represents personalist authoritarianism:

Law as an instrument, not a constraint
Elections as validation, not competition
National identity fused with the leader
Selective use of nationalist and fascist techniques

This model is flexible, legalistic, and adaptable — and therefore influential.

When observers note similarities between Trump and Putin, they are usually pointing to methods, not ideology:

Delegitimizing elections pre-emptively
Personalizing the state
Treating law as a tool
Framing criticism as betrayal
Prioritizing loyalty over competence

This is not fascism — but it is illiberal drift.

8. Narcissistic leadership as an accelerant

History suggests that narcissistic leaders do not create authoritarian systems alone — but they accelerate them.

Such leaders:

Personalize power
Interpret limits as personal attacks
Require constant affirmation
Externalize failure onto enemies
Escalate rather than compromise

Fascist and authoritarian systems often elevate such personalities because their psychology aligns with movements built on grievance, restoration, and loyalty.

Narcissism is not destiny — but it increases risk.

9. Why Europeans often recognize patterns earlier

European societies are trained by history to watch for:

Language shifts
Emergency justifications
Legal rebranding of force
Loyalty tests
Erosion of accountability

These are learned sensitivities, not moral superiority.

Countries that defeated fascism often believe they are immune to it.
Countries that were occupied by it tend to be more cautious.

Conclusion: tools, not verdicts

The United States is not a fascist state.
It is not Nazi Germany.
History is not repeating itself.

But history does not require repetition to be instructive.

What matters are mechanisms:

How identity is constructed
How decline is interpreted
How power is personalized
How law is used
How dissent is framed

Understanding these mechanisms allows readers to form their own conclusions — calmly, critically, and without hysteria.

The purpose of historical comparison is not to accuse the present, but to illuminate choices.

History does not predict outcomes.
It clarifies paths.